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Honesty and Intermediation: 
Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement and the 
Implications for Takeoff
BRISHTI GUHA*1)
Singapore Management University
Singapore
Abstract
We examine honesty and credible auditing in firm-investor relations in a 
repeated game of imperfect information, embedded in a general equilibrium 
framework. Informed auditors enhance credibility over a range of audit 
fees – despite the auditor’s incentive to collude – provided the probability of 
detection is imperfectly correlated across clients. 
Auditing can enhance growth especially for a relatively egalitarian 
distribution of wealth. We show that audit fees must be neither too high nor 
too low to enhance client credibility, highlight the role of mandatory audit 
fee disclosure, interpret international differences in shareholding patterns 
and uncover a possible rationale for audit industry concentration.
Keywords: Corporate governance, auditing, disclosure, inequality and 
takeoff, general equilibrium, repeated games
INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals have often featured firms cheating their 
shareholders, with or without auditor involvement. This environment 
raises issues of trust in firm-investor relations and of “self-enforcing 
honesty.” In particular, low shareholder trust obviously has adverse 
economy-wide repercussions. Once one expects to be dealt with 
*   School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, 
Singapore 178903. Email: bguha@smu.edu.sg. I thank two anonymous referees 
for valuable suggestions.
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dishonestly, this distrust discourages investors, leading to a collapse 
of industry. Honesty and trust, on the other hand, feed off each 
other. Focusing on the moral hazards faced by firm insiders, we 
ask when firm insiders behave honestly and characterize possible 
equilibria in a world with stochastic market outcomes and imperfect 
information. We also investigate when efficiency can be improved 
– through market creation or increased output and welfare – by 
employing informed intermediaries (like auditors) and when the 
presence of such intermediaries could lead to honest equilibria 
(taking into account the auditor’s possible temptations to collude 
with clients planning fraud or to extort blackmail from honest ones) 
for a greater range of parameters than in their absence. We show 
that this can happen provided that the probability of detecting 
malfeasance by an auditor is imperfectly correlated across clients, 
and on a tangent, we provide a moral-hazard related rationale 
for the concentrated structure of the auditing industry which is 
empirically observed. We also discuss some policy applications of 
our model and predictions relating to disclosure of audit contracts, 
public transparency and the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. We briefly 
discuss possible extensions of our work including suggestions 
on international differences in shareholding patterns. We relate 
our findings to those of other papers, including empirical papers 
examining the effect of different legal strength on demand for 
auditor quality across countries or regions, and those studying the 
relationship between shareholding patterns and auditor choice.
Our paper differs from most others on corporate governance in 
that it is also related to development.1) The distinction between 
entrepreneurs, who control firms, and ordinary investors, who do 
not, turns out to reflect the distribution of wealth. This link leads us 
into the realm of development economics. In our model the level and 
distribution of wealth affect the growth of corporations and indeed 
the very existence of the share market for reasons of credibility, 
with implications for the processes of industrial takeoff. We focus on 
the interplay of these wealth effects with the institution of credible 
auditing. In particular, after dealing with how credible auditing 
can be ensured despite collusion possibilities, we highlight how the 
emergence of a credible auditor affects industrial takeoff prospects, 
   1) However there is also a literature on financial markets and economic growth, the 
most relevant of which we will discuss later in the paper.
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entry into entrepreneurship and economic efficiency for any given 
wealth distribution.
While our basic tool is the infinite-horizon one-sided prisoner’s 
dilemma game, we embed this within a general equilibrium 
framework. This enables us to establish the existence of a unique 
equilibrium for any given set of parameters. It also makes it possible 
for us to endogenize the set of firms that participate actively in the 
game and the set of investors.
The general equilibrium context of our analysis is crucial because, 
as the Folk theorem assures us, an infinity of equilibria can be 
supported in an infinitely repeated game, given a high enough 
discount factor. The equilibrium we focus on however is the only 
one that is compatible with balance between demand and supply 
in a general equilibrium based on economy-wide parameters like 
the level and distribution of wealth. Moreover, people’s beliefs 
are aligned with the fundamentals of the economy, so that they 
expect only those equilibria to be chosen that are in line with these 
fundamentals.
Our paper delivers many interesting results. We find that without 
credible auditing, too much equality in the wealth distribution 
can impede economic growth – an effect which works through an 
interaction of wealth effects with share market imperfections. We 
then find that (a) audit fees can be neither too low nor too high 
to enhance client credibility, (b) given mandatory disclosure of 
audit fees, firms can credibly raise more capital and entry into 
entrepreneurship increases (c) auditing increases economic growth 
either if the economy is relatively poor or if there is a sizable middle 
class (in other situations, auditing may have a largely redistributive 
effect on payoffs), (d) firms are more eager to hire auditors with a 
large number of clients when the audit fee regime is transparent, 
and (e) auditors, especially those with a large number of clients, can 
serve as “substitute safeguards” for investors and such auditors can 
coexist along with a widely held shareholding pattern. As we discuss 
later, there is empirical support for some of these results, while the 
others are empirically testable. Moreover, our paper is also novel in 
examining the interaction between wealth distribution and corporate 
governance/auditing. The finance and growth literature does not do 
this, as it mainly looks at how various measures of credit market 
development affect the growth of industries and countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay 
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out our assumptions. Section 3 presents a possible model of insider-
outsider interaction in the absence of an external auditor, where the 
set of insiders is endogenized, and different types of equilibria are 
characterized. Section 4 discusses some features and developmental 
implications of this model. In section 5 we introduce auditing 
and derive conditions for an equilibrium with credible auditing 
and efficiency gains : we also discuss the sources of the efficiency 
gains that auditing can achieve, despite possibilities of auditor-
client collusion. While all these sections take capital structure as 
given, concentrating on equity financing, in section 6 we find the 
optimal capital structure, to which all our previous results remain 
applicable. In section 7 we propose some extensions dealing with 
international differences in share financing patterns. 
ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a community of infinitely-lived individuals. The 
wealth of each individual is inelastic and fixed:  they can neither 
save2) nor borrow and their capital does not depreciate. However, 
they can lend (to the outside world or to government) at a fixed 
interest rate R. All agents are risk-neutral.
Individuals can become entrepreneurs and set up firms, which 
however each require a minimum investment of I. Entrepreneurs 
have no access to any external source of funds other than investors. 
Problems of collective action and contract enforcement are sufficient 
to prevent them forming partnerships among themselves. Groups 
sufficiently cohesive to solve these problems (such as the members 
of the Zaibatsu, the Chaebol, the mercantile families of India and 
of the Chinese Diaspora) can be viewed as collective entities with a 
combined wealth that is the relevant factor in this case. Let F denote 
the personal funds of individuals or of groups of this kind. Those 
with F < I must therefore go public in order to set up an enterprise.
Each enterprise lasts one period only. Thereafter investors can 
recover their capital in its original form. A fresh enterprise requires 
refinancing by investors.
Firms enjoy good luck and earn a rate of profit of G on total 
capital with probability p, and suffer bad luck with a rate of profit 
   2) A justification is provided for this assumption in the Appendix
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of B otherwise (G > B). H = pG + (1 – p)B > R is the firm’s profit 
expectation on total capital. G and B are exogenous parameters – 
as for example if output is subject to exogenous shocks while prices 
are fixed in the world market as in a small open economy. 
Investors expect to receive the market rate of return D (dividend) 
on their capital. The entrepreneur in addition should receive an 
“autonomous” expected payment of A, which we also endogenize. 
For the bulk of this paper we shall assume that these expectations 
are to be met by promising outside investors (“shareholders” who 
contribute S to the firm’s capital) an amount DSG/H when luck is 
good and DSB/H when it is bad. The firm is to retain (A + DF)G/H 
and (A + DF)B/H under good and bad luck respectively. Therefore 
both outsiders’ and insiders’ payoffs are state-dependent. The 
outside investor can then expect an income of
pDSG/H + (1 – p)DSB/H = DS[pG/H + (1 – p)B/H] = DS 
if the firm acts as promised while the insider’s income expectations 
amount to A + DF. These sum of these income expectations A + D(F 
+ S) must equal the total expected profits of the enterprise H(F + S), 
implying A = (H – D)(F + S). This is a pure equity contract. 
However, we later consider other contracts that promise the same 
return to the investor and endogenize the firm’s choice between 
these alternatives.
We assume that B < R. As we will show later, this assumption will 
be sufficient to ensure that DB/H < R, so that outsiders prefer not 
to enter the industry if they expect to get only their bad luck dues. 
(We will argue D can never exceed H so as not to violate the insiders’ 
participation constraint.)
The parameters F, S, G, B and p are publicly known. But the 
actual fortunes of the firm cannot be observed by outsiders or legally 
verified. Therefore, the promise is not a fully enforceable contract. 
The firm can cheat by restricting outside investors to DSB/H even 
when luck is good.
There is a one-period-lagged publicly observable signal that 
detects cheating by insiders with an accuracy (probability) of q. All 
cheating is collectively remembered.
Of our assumptions, the one that needs further discussion is 
that of no savings. We assume zero savings so as to focus on the 
distinctive consequences of cheating without our results being 
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obscured by the changing dynamics of the accumulation and 
distribution of wealth. A justification for the assumption is provided 
in the Appendix.
We will need additional assumptions about auditing, but we defer 
a discussion of these for the present.
THE MODEL WITHOUT AUDITING
A cheating firm immediately gains 
G(F + S) – (A + DF)G/H – DSB/H
= (G – B)DS/H.
But it risks detection by the public signal. Exposure of firms as 
cheats compels them to withdraw their capital (without cost) and 
reinvent themselves as outside investors in other firms.3) Now the 
other option firms have is simply to get the outside opportunity cost 
on their funds. They will take whichever option gives them more. 
Recalling that q is the probability of being caught by the public 
signal, and δ is the discount factor, cheating is deterred if
( ) { max{ , } }
( )
G B DS
H
q A DF D R F− ≤ + −
−
δ
δ1
 (1)   
Let L = G – B.                                                                  
Assume first that D > R. This implies
A LDS
q H
≥ −( )1 δ
δ
.
Substituting for A in terms of D, one derives the inequality
D H F S q
F S q H LS
≤ +
+ + −
2
1
( )
( ) ( )
δ
δ δ  = D*. (2)
3)  We have an alternative specification in which cheating insiders’ wealth can be 
seized so that they get zero in all future periods. Qualitative differences from the 
model presented here are negligible, we omit this model here in the interests of 
space constraints.
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Alternatively, we can express this as a ceiling on s, where s stands 
for S/F, the ratio of outsiders to insider capital:
s q H H D
DL q H H D
≤ −
− − −
δ
δ δ
( )
[ ( )} ( )]1
 = s*(D), (3)
or as a lower limit to q:
q s LD
H H D s
≥ −
− +
( )
( )( )
1
1
δ
δ  = q*(D).   (4) 
(3) or equivalently, (4) is a credibility constraint. If s exceeds 
the limit set by (3), investors will expect the firm to cheat and 
will not therefore invest – and the firm knows this. The insider’s 
participation constraint is A ≥ 0: without this, the insider would 
invest in other firms rather than go into business himself since 
his income as an outside investor would exceed his income as an 
insider. A ≥ 0 implies
H ≥ D.       (5)
However, as long as D < H, the insider’s expected gains will be an 
increasing function of outside investment: so the profit maximizing 
firm will expand up to the limit represented by (3), converting this 
inequality into an equation4). s*(D) can then be represented in the 
positive quadrant of the (s, D) space by a curve that intercepts the 
vertical D-axis at D = H and declines monotonically to a horizontal 
asymptote at D = (qδH2)/{qδH + L(1 – δ)}. Intuitively, the moral 
hazard of the insider rises with D as well as with s. Any increase 
in D must therefore be offset by a decrease in s if the firm is to be 
deterred from cheating.  
If however this asymptote is less than R, we must redo our 
   4) The ceiling s* is determined by the parameters of the game, for a given D (which 
is endogenized in general equilibrium). We rule out equilibria which are not 
based on fundamentals – such as those in which every one shares a common 
belief about some other value of s*, not necessarily based on fundamentals, and 
invests accordingly because of the conviction that every one else shares the same 
belief. This is easily justifiable if we assume the absence of co-ordination devices: 
in that case common knowledge of every one else’s beliefs is ruled out, so each 
individual bases his or her behavior on fundamentals.
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calculations from the point at which the s*(D) curve dips below D = R. 
Assuming D < R, inequality (1) now yields 
D q H F S H RF
q HS LS
R≤ + −
+ −
≤δ
δ δ
[( ) ]
( )1
Or q
RLS
H H R F S
< −
− +
( )
( )( )
1 δ
δ
Or s
q H H R
RL q H H R
≤ −
− − −
δ
δ δ
( )
[ ( )} ( )]1
=s*.
These limits are independent of D, and therefore constant at the 
values reached by inserting D = R in (3) and (4).
D (or s) also determines the minimum wealth requirement for 
an entrepreneur to start business  Since the firm needs to reach a 
minimum size I to function, it cannot exist unless
I -F
F
s*≤ .  (6)
This implies
F I
1+s*
=F*.≥         (7)
F* is the minimum wealth needed for entry and depends on the 
level of s (or D).
 Let K be the aggregate wealth of the economy and P(W) the 
fraction of K owned by those with wealth below W. Then the total 
demand for outside capital generated by the entrepreneurs who can 
enter is
X K P I
s D
s Dd = − +
[ {
* ( )
}] * ( )1
1
 (8)
The term in square brackets is the ratio of entrepreneurial capital 
to the total wealth of the economy. The RHS, therefore, represents 
the amount of outside capital that entrepreneurs can apply for 
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without compromising their credibility. As D falls, not only can each 
firm credibly invite more outside investment, but also more firms 
can enter and create additional demand for capital.
The total supply of outside capital is the total wealth of those 
below the threshold for entry:
 X KP I
s Ds
=
+
[
* ( )
].
1
 (9)
This is subject to the outside investor’s participation constraint  D 
≥ R which enables them to recover their opportunity cost.
With the supply and demand functions for outsider capital thus 
defined, two kinds of equilibrium are possible:
First, (case 1) a regular interior equilibrium with H > D > R (figure 1) 
in which
s D
P I
s D
P I
s D
* ( )
(
* ( )
)
(
* ( )
)
= +
−
+
1
1
1
. (10)
A feature of this is that, for given I, the equilibrium value of s* is 
uniquely determined by the distribution of wealth alone. Write P as 
a function of s*, P = Q(s*), equation (10) then reduces to
s* = Q(s*)/{1 – Q(s*)},  (10a)
which has a unique solution. In this equilibrium, outside capital is 
fully employed without being in excess demand. The optimal ratio of 
outsider to entrepreneurial capital exactly corresponds to the ratio 
of wealth owned by those below the minimum entry requirement 
to that owned by those above. The interior equilibrium occurs for 
parameter ranges such that 
P I
s R
s R P I
s R
(
* ( )
) * ( )[ (
* ( )
)].
1
1
1+
< −
+
Second, (case 2) an equilibrium in which D = R, the participation 
constraint of the investor binds and investors are indifferent 
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between investing in the firm and in their outside option5) (figure 2). 
Here there is an “excess supply” of capital which has taken shelter 
in its outside option. This equilibrium occurs for parameter ranges 
such that
P I
s R
s R P I
s R
(
* ( )
) * ( )[ (
* ( )
)]
1
1
1+
> −
+ .
   5) However, investors will take care that their investment in the firm is not so much 
that it tempts cheating.
H
R
D
Xs,Xd
Xs
Xd
R
H
D
Xs,Xd
Xd
Xs
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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There also remains a possibility (case 3) that no market may exist. 
If Wmax is the wealth of wealthiest individual, P(Wmax) = 1. Suppose 
that s*(Dmin) = (I/Wmax) – 1. Then for all D ≥ Dmin, Xd = 0. The demand 
curve lies in the positive quadrant only for D < Dmin. Now, if Dmin < 
R, the demand and supply curves will not intersect. No equilibrium 
will be possible (figure 3). A low Wmax implies a higher s*( Dmin), and 
therefore a low Dmin. Thus if the society is a poor one without any 
rich individuals, a market may not exist.
To sum up, without auditing, only those with wealth above a 
threshold can become entrepreneurs. Moreover, a market may not 
exist if no one in the society has wealth above a particular floor. 
However, if a market exists, there can be two different types of 
equilibria depending on the distribution of wealth. Only one of these 
is an interior equilibrium (with insiders earning strictly more than 
outsiders, who in turn invest all their wealth in the enterprise and 
earn strictly more than R). In the second equilibrium, outsiders 
are indifferent between financing the enterprise and the outside 
opportunity – but some outsider capital is necessarily not invested 
in the enterprise in the interests of credibility.
SOME FEATURES OF THE MODEL
Before going on to our main results, which concern auditing, we 
highlight some features of the model without auditing. The model 
R
Dmin
D
K
Xs,Xd
Xd
Xs
Figure 3.
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so far has two sets of features. The first set, related to the idea that 
a high proportion of outsider financing intensifies moral hazard, is 
empirically supported by (Joh 2003) and (Lemmon and Lins 2003), 
who use evidence from Korea to show that in a large sample of 
externally audited firms, misappropriation by controlling insiders 
was severe wherever these insiders had a low ownership stake. 
Though our model deals with the share market, it is closely 
connected to theoretical models on imperfect markets for capital 
or credit. For example, in (Banerjee and Newman 1993), the initial 
wealth distribution in the population determines occupational 
choice - only those whose wealth exceeds a certain floor can become 
entrepreneurs. The underlying causes are imperfect capital markets 
(as entrepreneurs may renege on loans) and a minimum size 
requirement for making the enterprise operational. In our model 
we combine ideas of indivisibilities in enterprise size and imperfect 
capital markets with the moral hazard that entrepreneurs (insiders 
in our model) face with regard to their outside shareholders. 
This ties up with the second set of features of this model, those 
related to development. The model illuminates a key impediment 
to the industrialization of poor countries. In these countries, even 
when aggregate wealth is adequate for large-scale industry, it could 
be spread too thinly for effective mobilization. Too few individuals 
may be wealthy enough to either enter large-scale industry on 
their own or to attract enough outside funds to do so. The limits 
to borrowing are well-known. We show here the existence of a 
constraint on raising capital from the share market that operates 
through a limit on the ratio of outsider to insider capital set by 
concerns over cheating. This is one of the main causes of the 
thinness of share markets in most poor countries,6) It accounts for 
the dominance of extended families in the early industrialization 
of such countries, the role for example of business dynasties 
in nineteenth and early twentieth century Japan and twentieth 
century Korea, India and the Chinese business sphere, since capital 
flowed freely within these families because of a degree of trust and 
reciprocity among the members. (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 
2003) have a somewhat related explanation of the origin of family 
   6) Empirical work links the extent to which firms go public, as opposed to operating 
primarily as family-owned firms, to the extent of shareholder protection available. 
This becomes relevant to our work as we show later that credible external 
auditing can create a market and facilitate raising capital in the share market. 
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firms; in their story, family firms are a second best solution in 
environments where poor investor protection limits the founding 
family’s ability to control expropriation by a manager. Our model, 
in contrast to theirs, emphasizes the role of indivisibilities and of 
the distribution of wealth. [Other theoretical explanations of family 
firms exist, however, some of which are surveyed in (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2006). For example, if talent is inherited, and if founding a 
firm requires talent, family firms may have access to a better talent 
pool. Moreover, family firms might take a more long-run perspective 
to management if they are concerned about their heirs. Some 
explanations centre on kinships between business and politics in 
countries where the latter has an important impact on the former 
(Faccio 2006)].
Our model also explains the strategy of governments like the 
Korean to deliberately foster inequality so as to facilitate the 
accumulation of personal fortunes that could help in building up 
credible large-scale industries.7)
If, however, a market exists, and particularly if we have an interior 
equilibrium of the kind depicted in figure 1, the role of wealth 
inequality changes. Here, the equilibrium ratio of outsider to insider 
capital s* is, for any given I, uniquely determined by the distribution 
of wealth;  and it can be shown that the more egalitarian the 
distribution of a given aggregate wealth (in the sense of a higher P(  ) 
for any W), the higher must s* be in equilibrium:  the demand curve 
for outside capital Xd(D) will lie further to the left,  the supply curve 
Xs(D) further to the right, so that D will be lower. Indeed, as the 
distribution of wealth becomes more equitable, the equilibrium level 
of D may fall to R (as in figure 2). This leads to inefficiency as some 
wealth is then necessarily invested in the outside option, earning 
R instead of being invested in industry, earning a higher rate of 
return, H. Of course, any  increase in equity beyond this point leads 
to the disappearance of the market.
Initial wealth inequality therefore has a positive effect on overall 
income for two reasons, up to a certain level of inequality at which 
“excess supply” of outsider capital is eliminated. The positive 
effect at small levels of inequality stems from (a) the necessity 
of some individuals owning enough personal wealth to meet the 
entrepreneurial floor, which is necessary for industry to take off 
   7) (Lal and Myint 1996) provide a good discussion of this.
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and (b) even beyond this, an increase in inequality can ensure 
that an interior equilibrium obtains rather than an excess supply 
equilibrium – tantamount to an increase in efficiency as it implies 
all wealth would then be invested in industry rather than some 
being consigned to the less profitable outside option. However, 
once inequality becomes large enough to move the economy into an 
interior equilibrium, further increases in wealth inequality have no 
effect on overall economic efficiency, merely having a redistributive 
effect through the impact on D. To focus on credibility issues, we 
have not made complicating technological assumptions apart from 
assuming positive minimum size requirements on enterprise. Had 
we assumed increasing or decreasing returns to scale, for example, 
it is likely that inequality would have had further effects beyond the 
point at which the supply of outsider capital can fully be absorbed 
into industry – but our simple technology of constant returns to 
capital, our only factor, precludes these possibilities.
This view of equity as a barrier to industrialization – at least at 
low levels of inequality – contrasts starkly with the received wisdom 
articulated, for example, by (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
They see equity as laying the foundations of industrialization by 
creating a large homogeneous mass market for manufactures. 
This, however, is only a demand phenomenon and can influence 
production only under autarchy, since here consumption and 
production patterns must coincide. In a small open economy, the 
two are independent.
Empirical evidence on the effect of initial inequality on growth 
is mixed. While earlier cross-sectional studies tended to suggest 
a negative relationship between inequality and growth, (for 
example, (Persson and Tabellini 1994)), other work seems to 
indicate otherwise. (Forbes 2000) and (Li and Zou 1998) discover a 
positive relationship. They use fixed effects and trace the negative 
relationship in earlier studies essentially to omitted variables. 
(Deininger and Squire 1998) and (Barro 2000) find mixed results for 
panels while (Banerjee and Duflo 2003) find that inequality as such 
is neutral in its impact on growth, though changes, both positive 
and negative, in inequality tend to erode growth. While there have 
been many traditional theoretical arguments in favor of a negative 
impact of inequality on growth,8) the theoretical literature has also 
  8) Apart from the Murphy et al view, which as we have mentioned applies to a 
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been mixed. (Aghion and Williamson 1998) suggested that inequality 
favors industrialization in the presence of start-up costs, also a 
feature of our model. Unlike Aghion and Williamson, we abstract 
from decreasing returns to scale to focus on the moral hazard 
aspects of the problem, which is why we find that inequality stops 
having any aggregate effect when all wealth becomes invested in 
industry. Also, in our model the effect of small levels of inequality 
operates not just through the ability to start the enterprise but 
also by making it unnecessary for outsiders to keep some wealth 
in the less profitable option. Both these factors may serve to offset 
potential negative effects of inequality, resulting in mixed empirical 
evidence.9)10)
A wealthier economy with the same degree of inequality in initial 
asset distribution – i. e. with more total wealth but the same Lorenz 
curve – would have the opposite features. The proportion of total 
wealth P(W) owned by people with less than a given level W of 
personal wealth will be lower;  given I,  outsider capital requirements 
will be lower in equilibrium, thus permitting a higher expected 
income D for outside investors. It becomes easier to sustain a 
credible capital market – an addition to the long list of factors that 
tend to make industrialization a cumulative process. 
Finally, an increase in minimum firm-size requirements I with the 
same level and distribution of wealth will increase P for any given s*, 
thereby depressing the demand curve for outside capital and driving 
up the supply curve, reducing D and increasing s* in equilibrium. 
Thus, technological indivisibilities make it more likely that markets 
would collapse.
Our model also relates to, but is different from, the finance and 
growth literature that links financial market development with 
economic growth. As an example consider (Rajan and Zingales 
1998). They show empirically that industries dependent on external 
finance grow quickly when financial markets are more developed – 
closed economy, there are political economy arguments that inequality leads to 
redistributive policies which hamper growth (variants of which are presented in 
(Alesina and Rodrik 1994) and (Persson and Tabellini 1994)) – though (Benabou 
2000) has argued that neither of these premises holds true in the data.
  9) Admittedly, our problem is considerably simplified because of the static nature of 
the wealth distribution.
10) In our world, a policy-maker who lexicographically prefers income maximization 
to equity, would choose an optimal wealth distribution – one with just enough 
inequality to eliminate an excess supply equilibrium in favor of an interior one.
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as measured by the ratio of the sum of stock market capitalization 
and domestic credit to GDP. However our model endogenizes the 
development of the share market in terms of parameters like the 
wealth distribution and industry startup costs. Interestingly, 
however, Rajan and Zingales also show empirically that better 
accounting standards have the same positive effect on growth. 
This is consistent with our model; if we interpret better accounting 
standards as a higher q, s* increases for any given D, shifting up 
the demand curve for capital and making it more likely that (a) 
an equilibrium exists, so that industry can take off, and (b) the 
equilibrium is an interior equilibrium so that all capital is invested 
in industry instead of lying idle in the outside option. This would 
boost economic growth.
THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR
The induction of an auditor who can detect and expose cheating 
by firms changes the picture. We now assume that auditing 
expertise (an advantage in investigating firms who report having 
had bad luck and determining if they are cheating) is exogenously 
distributed in the population as a binary variable taking on the 
values of 0 or 1. Individuals with 0 auditing expertise can never 
become auditors, while those with an expertise of 1 can. To simplify 
matters we assume that the outside option on their auditing time 
is zero. Each auditor inelastically offers his services to firms – one 
auditor can service many firms.
In what follows we pinpoint policies which guarantee that auditing 
has beneficial effects on honesty and efficiency and remains credible 
in spite of the possibility of auditor-client collusion. We show that 
credible auditing facilitates Pareto improvements in equilibrium by 
relaxing the credibility constraint. s*(D) increases for any level of D. 
Firms can mobilize more outside capital for a given rate of payout. 
Also, the minimum wealth level required for entry falls, so that more 
entrepreneurs enter. We prove this below and then discuss the 
consequences for the different kinds of equilibrium specified above.
Let V denote the fee to be paid at the outset of each period to a 
firm-hired auditor. For the time being, we defer a discussion of how 
many auditors are actually in business. If the investors receive low 
returns, the auditor investigates and then delivers an audit report 
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on whether the firm cheated or has just been unlucky. At this 
stage, the firm and the auditor can bargain with each other, the 
firm offering a bribe in exchange for a favorable report, the auditor 
demanding extra payment for such a report. We discuss below the 
feasible strategies open to each of the actors in this scenario.
First, firms may or may not hire auditors at time t = 0, paying an 
agreed fee. In either event, they may or may not cheat. If they have 
hired an auditor and cheated, they may choose to bribe him by 
offering extra payment concurrently with the delivery of a favourable 
audit report, or they may not. They could make the offer right at the 
outset (at the time of hiring) or later after the cheating and perhaps 
the investigation has occurred. If they have hired an auditor and not 
cheated, and the auditor demands an extra payment for certifying to 
the fact, they may pay or may not.
Second, the auditor accepts a fee at t = 0 and checks whether 
cheating has occurred. If it has, he could truthfully report the fact 
or suppress it for a bribe. If it has not, he could truthfully report 
this without additional demands or demand a payment for such a 
report. He also however has the option of negotiating at the outset of 
the period with the firm, offering it a clean report card in exchange 
for a bribe, both to be delivered at the end of the period.
Third, investors observe at t = 0 whether firms have hired auditors 
or not. Depending on the information regime assumed, they may or 
may not get to know the auditor’s fees. They then decide whether to 
invest in a firm or not. At t = 1, they may reinvest – or they may not. 
The information they have at this moment includes the return they 
have received last period, the ratio of insider to outsider capital, the 
auditor’s report and the public signal.
Proposition 1: With auditing, there exists an equilibrium where 
(a) all firms engage auditors and act honestly, (b) the auditor neither 
colludes with cheats, nor does he extort by threatening to blacklist 
honest firms, (c) investors know this and finance the industry, (d) 
the investors’ off-equilibrium strategy is to shun any firm which is 
not the auditor’s client, to withdraw from any firm the auditor labels 
a cheat, and to mistrust the auditor if and only if he is revealed by 
the public signal to be colluding with or blackmailing a client. If 
audit fees lie in a certain range, and this is disclosed to investors, 
the honest equilibrium is assured.
For given D, credible auditing (1) raises the ceiling on s below 
which investors will be able to finance the industry without being 
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cheated and (2) lowers the floor on the entry requirements for 
entrepreneurship – even if collusion and extortion are strategies 
open to the auditor.. 
Proof: Becoming an auditor’s client and staying honest thereafter 
is more attractive for firms than not hiring an auditor if and only if
A + {D – max (D, R)}F – V > 0 (11)
or substituting for A, and using D ≥ R in equilibrium,    
(H – D)(F + S) – V > 0. (12)
If firms are to have no incentive to cheat after becoming the 
auditor’s client (and risking certain exposure by the auditor), we 
require:
[( )( ) ]H D F S V DSL
H
− + − >δ
δ
 
1-
.   (13)
If V were 0, the LHS would be the present value of future honesty 
which we denote  by Ph, so that (13) boils down to
P V DSL
Hh
−
−
>δ
δ1
. (13a)
This caps the audit fee that could sustain an honest equilibrium. 
The auditor’s fee however must not only be positive but also 
sufficient to deter collusion or extortion by him if he is to be credible.
Colluding firms and auditors are vulnerable to exposure by the 
public signal. The firm takes this into account:  the maximum bribe 
it is willing to pay the auditor is its cheating gain less expected 
loss due to possible exposure plus expected saving in that event of 
future audit fees. The auditor compares this bribe with his possible 
loss of future fees from all his N clients11) who will dismiss him, 
once exposure undermines shareholder confidence in him. In the 
circumstances, the auditor may ask for bribes, not from one, but 
from all his clients in exchange for collusion with all [we show in 
the appendix that this is generally the optimal course for an auditor 
who proposes to collude;  however our results are not dependent on 
11) 10. We will shortly discuss how N is determined.
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multiple collusion, as we explain in a later sub section.]
Collusion offers must be made in advance (so that firms can cheat 
if they so desire) – but implemented only at the end of the period by 
simultaneous exchange of bribes for good reports. 
Suppose then that before firms announce their payouts the 
auditor can make a secret offer of a favourable report to each his 
clients in exchange for a bribe to be paid synchronously with the 
delivery of the report. If this were possible, the auditor might be able 
to extract bribes from all his clients (rather than from just one) and 
would stand to lose fees from all if caught. Each client of course 
decides independently on the auditor’s offer. 
How does q, the probability of detection of collusion, change 
as the number of collusions increases? Detection in a single case 
destroys the credibility of the auditor and his relationship with all 
his clients. Assume that the auditor’s probability of being caught is 
imperfectly correlated across firms: q for the auditor is an increasing 
function of N*, q(N*), where N* is the number of clients who decide 
to collude with him. We defer for the moment the question of how 
N* is determined. An extreme example is a scenario in which the 
probability of not being caught while colluding with any one firm is 
independent of the probability of not being caught while colluding 
with any other. Here, we would have
q(N*) = 1 – {1 – q(1)}N*.
The most that each firm can offer as a bribe equals gains from 
cheating less expected loss if caught (the discounted value of future 
payoffs the entrepreneur could have got as an insider minus the fees 
he would have had to pay the auditor if both were still in business): 
the relevant level of public signal accuracy here is q(1), the signal 
that guides investors. Thus the no collusion constraint is:
( *) (1)(1)
1 1h
q N V DSL q Vq P
H
δ δ
δ δ
> − +
− −
or    [ ( *) (1)] (1)
1 h
q N q V DSL q P
H
δ
δ
− > −
−
. (14)
(13a) and (14) together impose the following range of inequalities 
on auditor fees:
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This range is non-empty if and only if
q N P q N q DSL
Hh
( *) [ ( *) ( )]> + −1 1 .  (16)
If q(N*) = q(1), this last inequality implies that firms would have 
no incentive to cheat even without an auditor. If q(N*) > q(1), firms 
might cheat in the absence of an auditor, but not under the eyes of 
one who receives a fee in the appropriate range.
The implied upper limit on the ratio of outsider to insider capital 
is
s q N H H D
DL q N q q N H H D
m = −
− + − − −
( *) ( )
( )[ ( *) ( )] ( *) ( )
δ
δ δ1 1 1
. (17)
Now
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if and only if
q N DL q H H D( *)[ ( ) ( ) ( )]1 1− − −δ δ
> − + − − −q DL q N q q N H H D( )[ ( )[ ( *) ( )] ( *) ( )]1 1 1 1δ δ
or if and only if
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Thus the auditor raises the limit on outsider financing compatible 
with honesty – and lowers the floor on wealth required to become 
an entrepreneur – provided the public signal is imperfect and his 
probability of being caught is an increasing function of the number 
of clients he attempts to collude with. 
If collusion can be prevented, auditing has a larger role the 
noisier the public signal (the smaller is q(1)). Control of collusion, 
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however, is facilitated by fees in the appropriate range, by a more 
accurate public signal and by greater patience on the firm’s part: 
sm, the credible limit on the ratio of outsider to insider capital, is an 
increasing function of q(1) and q(N*) and of δ.
We have yet to consider the possibility of extortion by auditors. 
Auditors may attempt extortion from an honest but unlucky firm 
by threatening to falsely report that it had cheated. However, the 
firm being blackmailed would recognize the emptiness of this threat. 
It realizes that if it refuses to pay, the auditor has no incentive 
to actually implement its threat:  while the auditor does not gain 
anything from lying about the firm (given the latter’s refusal to pay), 
he stands to lose his reputation – and therefore his future clientele 
– if his lying is exposed by the public signal. Thus, in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium extortion is ruled out.
Q.E.D.
Turn now to the determination of N* and N. Firms decide 
independently on the collusion proposal and unanimity is not 
guaranteed. However, they differ only in size. Moreover, all firms 
have an incentive to drive s to the common credibility limit 
determined by the market parameter D. Thus, ultimately, firms 
differ only in the volume of entrepreneurial capital F and all 
differences in their behavior should be traceable to differences in 
F. Now, every expression involving capital in all our behavioral 
inequalities is linear homogeneous in F and S – therefore in F (since 
s = S/F is the same for all firms). Accordingly, any proposal that 
makes auditing fees and bribes proportional to insider capital and 
is acceptable to one firm will be acceptable to all. Therefore N* = N – 
the  entire clientele of the audit firm.
We now come to the long deferred question of how N is determined 
– how many auditors are actually hired and what is the clientele size 
of each? In the beginning of this section, we have already spelled 
out our assumptions on the supply of auditing expertise. Suppose M 
individuals in the population have auditing expertise of value 1, and 
each inelastically offers his services to firms. Now firms know that 
an auditor can service several clients, and that each auditor must 
be paid a credibility wage (corresponding to the Shapiro-Stiglitz 
efficiency wage) of at least V = V = {(1 – δ)/δ}[{(DSL/H) – q(1)Ph}/
{q(N) – q(1)}] [this is derived from (15), substituting N for N*]. Recall 
that this credibility wage is the minimum wage auditors must be 
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paid to guarantee that they have no incentive to collude, and thus 
to make auditing credible. Now as in all models with an efficiency 
wage flavor, there is some unemployment, that is a large number 
of individuals with auditing expertise will not actually be hired. In 
this situation of excess supply of auditing expertise, the auditors’ 
wage will go down to the lower limit of V although it cannot go any 
lower due to reasons of credibility. Examining the expression for 
V, we see immediately that it is decreasing in q(N) and hence in 
N : firms also realize this and figure out that the credibility wage 
they have to pay auditors will be lower if they can hire an auditor 
with a large number of other clients. The intuition behind this is 
the following : if an auditor has a large number of clients his costs 
from colluding increase sharply so that even if his wage is not 
very high, his expected losses from collusion become high enough 
(due to high probability of getting caught) to deter collusion. So 
an auditor with more clients needs to be paid a relatively small 
credibility wage.12) Due to this, each firm seeks to hire an auditor 
with as many clients as possible. If there were no limit on how 
many clients a single auditor could service, what would in fact 
emerge would be a monopoly in the auditing industry. However 
more realistically suppose that a single auditor faces an upper limit 
L on the number of clients it can service: in this case what would 
emerge is an oligopoly where firms each hire just enough auditors 
such that N = L (each auditor services the maximum number of 
clients he is technologically capable of servicing) and the number 
of auditors hired is equal to the total number of firms divided by L; 
the rest remain unemployed. This concentrated auditing structure 
that emerges in our model is consistent with the fact that auditing 
is in reality a highly concentrated industry. In the US, for example, 
the Big Four auditing firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers) audited 99% of all public company sales 
in 2003 (Cunningham 2006). The same paper mentions that the 
Herfendahl – Hirshman index measuring market concentration 
was well above 1800 for auditing in 2006, indicating a very highly 
concentrated market structure. In many other countries too auditing 
was controlled largely by a small group of four to six big firms. We 
do not of course deny that there may be other reasons as well for 
this high degree of concentration.
12) Please see the next paragraph for a discussion of this point.
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Our finding may at first seem at odds with the observation that 
the biggest auditing firms generally charge higher fees than other 
auditors. However, on closer inspection we find that the credibility 
wage V is in fact linear homogeneous in S and therefore in F, the 
entrepreneur’s personal wealth. Therefore, though the credibility 
wage that a particular entrepreneur must pay is lower if he hires 
an auditor with many clients (relative to if he hires one with few), 
we could observe a cross-sectional pattern of large auditors being 
paid higher fees if relatively rich entrepreneurs (that is, those with 
high F) hired the largest auditors. Thus this pattern does not in fact 
contradict our model. In addition, there may be other factors, such 
as differences in the quality of auditing expertise, that may also 
generate differences in fees across large and small auditors. Our 
model does not deal with such factors as we assume homogeneous 
audit quality.
Auditing is depicted by us as a commitment device and audit fees 
are the cost of credible commitment. This is why auditors have to be 
paid a credibility wage of V which is strictly higher than the outside 
option for their services. Another implication of this is that the 
auditing structure which emerges is highly concentrated, mirroring 
reality.
This implication, however, only holds when firms want or need 
to signal credibility. Therefore, it is more pronounced for private 
sector firms, and more pronounced when audit fee disclosure is 
mandatory (as has been the case in the US since 2002 and in many 
other countries since even earlier) which enables investors to check 
if auditors’ fees satisfy the no-collusion condition. The importance of 
mandatory audit fee disclosure is indirectly supported by (DeFond, 
Wong and Li 2000) who find – in a study of Chinese firms at a 
time when audit fee disclosure was not mandatory in China13) – 
that reforms which raised accounting standards were followed by 
a “flight from audit quality.” Firms which sought to collude with 
their auditors responded by switching to smaller and lower-quality 
auditors. This, too, is consistent with our model as smaller auditors 
in our setup are more willing to collude since their chances of 
being detected in collusion are relatively small. Along similar lines, 
(Wang, Wong and Xia 2008) find that state-owned enterprises in 
China have a higher tendency to hire small local auditors, and find 
13) It was made mandatory in 2001.
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evidence that one of the reasons behind this is the greater ease of 
colluding with these auditors. Privately owned enterprises – possibly 
because of credibility pressures as in our model – were on the other 
hand significantly less likely to use such auditors. In contrast to 
Wang et al., who emphasize that smaller auditors may have made 
more attractive collusion partners being easier to control, our model 
provides an additional reason why small auditors may themselves 
be relatively eager (compared to large ones) to engage in collusion. 
(Titman and Trueman 1986) contains a theoretical model in which 
firm insiders intending to cheat investors (on the strength of certain 
private information) hire a poor-quality auditor so that collusion is 
easier. Though our model does not deal with differences in audit 
quality, the number of an auditor’s clients can be a rough proxy for 
quality, given findings of a positive association between audit size 
and audit quality (eg Choi et al. 2010a; Colbert and Murray 1999).
Our model implies that audit fees should be neither too small 
nor too large to maintain credibility (Choi, Kim and Zang 2010b). 
shows that audit quality tends to suffer if an audit firm is paid 
“abnormally high” audit fees. They argue that the abnormal audit 
fees are essentially bribes that induce collusive behavior on the part 
of auditors. 
Multiple Collusions or Multiple Clients?
In the proof given above, we show that our results hold even 
when the rewards from collusion are maximized by the auditor 
colluding simultaneously with all his clients and receiving bribes 
from all of them (we also of course show – in an appendix – that 
such simultaneous collusion will be, under certain assumptions, the 
best course for the auditor to pursue if he is to collude). However, 
simultaneous collusions are by no means necessary for our results. 
In the appendix, we prove that they continue to hold even if the 
auditor colludes with just a single client so long as he has other 
clients as well.
The single collusion analysis calls to mind the effectiveness of 
multilateral punishments for infractions in two-player interactions 
as in (Greif 1991). Even without conscious multilateral punishment 
by the client firms, the auditor’s reputation, once lost, ensures that 
none of them find it worthwhile to hire him in future.
This emphasis on the reputation of an independent external 
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auditor and on the related role played by a multiplicity of clients on 
collusion incentives distinguishes our work from that of previous 
authors: for example (Kofman and Lawarree 1993), and (Khalil and 
Lawarree 2006), essentially model side payments to an internal 
auditor while the external auditor is assumed to be honest. Hence, 
the issue of the auditor’s reputation or the number of clients does 
not play a role14) (Baiman, Evans and Nagarajan 1991). do not model 
the incentives for collusion, unlike us, but allow nature to determine 
whether self-enforcing collusive arrangements can prevail.15) 
Why does Auditing Relax the Credibility Ceiling?
We have shown that auditing relaxes the credibility ceiling, despite 
the possibility of collusion between an auditor and his clients. We 
have already shown that each auditor will have multiple clients. 
In the case of collective or multiple collusion, it is crucial that the 
probability of his being caught colluding  increases with the number 
of clients he colludes with, or, equivalently, that the public signal is 
imperfectly correlated across firms. Because of this, an auditor has 
to worry about facing the penalty for collusive behavior for a greater 
range of parameters then does a single firm attempting to cheat 
in an auditor’s absence. Therefore, the auditor enforces honest 
behavior for a greater parameter range. The imperfect correlation 
of the public signal across firms becomes important given the fact 
that the auditor in general prefers to collude with all his clients 
simultaneously. We must emphasize again that our results are 
not dependent on this simultaneous collusion, as proved in the 
appendix.
Multiplicity of transactions (“diversification”) and imperfect 
correlation of the rewards and penalties from them have of course 
been at the heart of many phenomena in corporate governance. 
Managers working on multiple independent projects can be 
punished for neglecting a project by withholding from them the 
returns of their other projects without running into the constraint 
14) There are many other differences from our framework including the facts that the 
principal pays the auditors in their models, and that the effect of auditing on en-
try into entrepreneurship is not modeled, as the set of firms is exogenous.
15) Another related paper is (Tirole 1986), which, though it does not deal explicitly 
with auditing, considers side payments in a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchi-
cal relationship. His focus is on the optimal length of such relationships.
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of limited liability: this induces them to perform better (Laux 2001). 
Debt-financed bankers monitoring a diversified asset portfolio are 
likelier to be able to repay their debts:  so they can expect a full-
liability payoff on their monitoring efforts – a fact that improves 
their incentive to monitor (Cerasi and Daltung 2000; Diamond 
1984). In our model, multiplicity of clients and imperfect correlation 
of the risk of detection of collusions facilitate the punishment of 
colluders, improve the incentives for honest auditing and increase 
the credibility of auditing as a commitment device.
Discussion: credible auditing, entrepreneurial entry and takeoff 
Auditing relaxes the credibility constraint and reduces the wealth 
requirement for entry. This raises both the supply and demand 
curves for capital with the following consequences for the different 
equilibria specified.
First, the new interior equilibrium will replicate the old ratio of 
outsider to entrepreneurial capital s* (determined by the wealth 
distribution independently of all other factors) but at a higher payoff 
D for investors. Entry requirements (determined by s*) are invariant, 
so is the set of firms. Since all available capital was fully invested in 
the industry and remains so after the change, there is no impact on 
output, only a redistribution from firms to investors and auditors.
Second, if equilibrium occurred earlier on the horizontal stretch 
of the supply curve,  the rise in both curves will absorb some of 
the excess supply of capital into the industry (at the same payoff 
R) or all of it (at a higher payoff). In the former case, higher s* will 
invite more outside capital without change in its payoff, reduce 
entry requirements and attract more firms. Outside investors will 
be no worse than before, while firms benefit – incumbents from a 
higher s, new entrants from a rise in payoff above opportunity cost 
R. The Pareto improvement is possible because excess capital earlier 
reduced to its outside option is now in the industry, increasing its 
output by more than its displaced earnings. In the latter case, there 
is a shift to a regular interior equilibrium. s* rises, leading to new 
entry and more outside investment in each firm at a higher payoff D 
> R. Outside investors and new firms benefit; whether incumbents 
benefit or not depends on whether higher s compensates for the 
higher payout D. In any event, industry output increases. So the 
gains of the gainers will more than offset the losses of the losers, 
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and the changed scenario is optimal according to the Hicks-Kaldor-
Scitovsky compensation criteria.
Finally, where no market exists, the change could create one if 
it raises s*(R) above (I/Wmax) – 1, increasing credibility to the point 
where a firm can offer investors their opportunity cost. The Pareto-
improvement is clear; so is its source – the emergence of the market. 
This fits in with empirical evidence by (La Porta et al. 1997) that 
firms tend to go public in the first place only if good measures of 
shareholder protection are in place. This is consistent with our 
implication that investor protection (like auditing), by making it 
possible to credibly raise share-capital, determines whether firms go 
public or remain family enterprises.
From our discussion we can gather the following. In case 3 – 
where a market is created by auditing – there are clear gains to 
hiring an auditor, and this happens, as we discussed before, when 
no one in the society has very much wealth. Here credible auditing 
makes it possible for industry to take off. In situation 2, too an 
auditor adds to net social welfare. Situation 2 – that of excess supply 
of capital – is likely to arise when there is a strong middle class so 
that much wealth is owned by those not qualified to become insiders 
because their wealth is below the entry threshold. Thus another 
situation when auditing is beneficial is when there is a strong 
middle class. Here, credible auditing facilitates entrepreneurial 
entry and increases overall output. Finally, in situation 1, firms do 
not gain from auditing. Investors, however, do. In this situation, we 
could perhaps see intermediaries hired by investors instead of firm-
hired auditors. 
Our results suggest that a firm-hired auditor is important either 
when every one in the society is strongly wealth constrained, or 
when there is a prominent middle class. Moreover, with mandatory 
audit fee disclosure – backed by heavy penalties for false disclosure 
– large auditors are hired and result in higher economic growth 
in the circumstances just identified. To make auditing credible, 
audit fees need to be neither too large nor too small. Moreover, in 
these cases, ownership is likely to become more diffuse as credible 
auditing increases the proportion of financing that outsiders are 
willing to supply.
(Choi and Wong 2007) find evidence for the “strong governance” 
view, finding that the demand for large/high-quality auditors is 
greater where legal institutions are weak. Their interpretation is that 
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these auditors are more effective at resolving agency problems and 
problems caused by asymmetric information – problems which are 
more severe when legal institutions providing protection to investors 
are weak. Our results are compatible with these findings, since we 
find that credible auditing is in demand and is in fact most useful in 
countries which are relatively poor.16) 
Our results on the relationship between diffuse ownership and 
credible auditing are supported by (Simunic and Stein 1987), 
according to whom firms which hire a big auditor (one of the then “big 
eight”) were likely to have a lower insider stake. 
Auditors dislike any rise in public transparency for two reasons. 
First, lower q increases the probability that auditors can do better 
than the public signal and so increases demand for them. Secondly, 
audit fees that guarantee an honest equilibrium are lower for an 
accurate public signal (particularly if accuracy increases speedily 
with the number of clients). The logic is that if the signal is 
inaccurate, auditors’ future fees should be high for the expected loss 
of such fees (should collusion be exposed) to outweigh the current 
period bribes the auditor could extract. Auditors therefore would 
dislike changes such as disclosure of stock options as costs.17)
In the light of our model, we now briefly discuss some suggested 
antidotes to corporate fraud such as the reforms partly embodied 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One such measure is the separation 
of audit from non-audit activities. The idea is that this would 
restrict opportunities for bribery (for example through a generous 
investment banking mandate to buy the auditor-cum-investment 
banker’s collusion). Certainly, a legally enforced separation of audit 
from non-audit activities could increase the credibility of auditing 
by making covert bribery difficult and facilitating detection. In terms 
of our model, it would raise q, resulting in a wider range of fees 
satisfying the conditions for honest auditing.18) 
Although the inaccessibility of outside credit for entrepreneurs 
16) We also find that they are useful in countries with a high degree of equality, but 
this result does not relate directly to (Choi and Wong 2007).
17) This conclusion might be modified if we assumed that auditors can detect 
cheating only inaccurately. In that case, they might be helped by higher q, with 
the public signal complementing their efforts. But the effects mentioned above 
would still be present. 
18) Some relevant literature on the effect of the provision of non audit services on 
auditing firms’ tendency to qualify a report includes (Wines 1994; Barkess and 
Simnett 1994; Craswell, Stokes and Laughton 2002).
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may significantly restrict market creation, particularly when credit 
market imperfection is compounded by a wealth distribution with 
too few wealthy individuals, auditing can partially compensate for 
this market imperfection. Mandatory disclosure of audit fees ensures 
that in spite of collusion possibilities, auditing remains credible, 
relaxing requirements for entrepreneurial entry as long as each 
auditor has multiple clients. Auditors, on the other hand, dislike a 
too-perfect credit market that enables firms to set up business for 
lower values of public transparency and thus minimizes the need for 
auditors.
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
Equity contracts of course are only one of the possible ways of 
raising capital. Consider an alternative scenario in which the firm 
has a menu of contracts to choose from. The most general form of 
contract that our liquidity-constrained firm can offer its investors is 
the promise to deliver min [DGS, G(F + S)] if it is lucky and min[DBS, 
B(F + S)] if unlucky (where pDG + (1 – p)DB = D). This is a contract 
that explicitly allows for the possibility of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
is possible if DBS > B(F + S). On the other hand, if DBS ≤ B(F + S) – 
implying s ≤ sl = B/(DB – B) – bankruptcies are impossible and any 
claim of bankruptcy will be legally barred. 
The possibility of bankruptcy raises the specter of false 
bankruptcies. The entrepreneur could claim misfortune even 
when he has been lucky, distribute B(F + S) < DBS to his investors 
and decamp with the spoils (DG – B)S – BF. (Bankruptcy implies 
closure of the firm and loss of subsequent insider profit:  so false 
bankruptcies are unprofitable if the present value of this loss 
exceeds its one-time cheating gain – if
δ
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δ δ
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Of course, this implies a meaningful limit on s only if sb > 0, which 
occurs if and only if
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(1 – δ)(DG – B) > δ(H – D).
If s ≤ sb or if DBS ≤ B(F + S), there will be no false bankruptcies. 
However,  firms could still cheat by misrepresenting the fortunes 
of the business and offering investors DBS instead of their rightful 
dues DGS, risking detection by the public signal and loss of future 
income. This variety of cheating would be unprofitable if and only if
q H D F S D D SG B
δ
δ
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( )
( )( ) ( )
−
− − − −1
 = sd.
An optimal contract is one that maximizes s while eliminating 
false bankruptcies as well as the incentive to dishonestly offer 
investors DBS instead of DGS. Bankruptcy would be impossible if 
the contract itself provides that, in the event of bad luck, the entire 
proceeds of the firm should go to the outside investor: DBS = B(F + 
S). This is indeed the maximum guarantee against misfortune that a 
liquidity-constrained firm can credibly promise the outside investor: 
it maximizes DB subject to credibility. If max DB = B(F + S)/S ≤ D ≤ 
DG, the implication is that it minimizes the cheating premium (DG – 
DB) for any given D – and thereby maximizes sd. It follows that this is 
the optimal contract whenever  B(F + S)/S ≤ D. Given that investors 
are to receive B(F + S) under bad luck, the contract must provide for 
a good luck payout that ensures an expected return D:
pDGS + (1 – p)B(F + S) = DS
or DGS = [DS – (1 – p)B(F + S)]/p.
With DG and DB thus determined, (DG – DB)S reduces to {DS – B(F + 
S)}/p, yielding
s ≤ ŝ = 
δ δ
δ δ
pq H D B
D B pq H D
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
− + −
− − − −
1
1
.
Thus, the optimal contract also imposes a ceiling on s that is a 
decreasing function of D.
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The picture is rather different if B(F + S)/S > D. With a 
contract that offers investors B(F + S) in the event of bad luck, 
this configuration tempts the firm to cheat the investor in the 
diametrically opposite way – by offering the smaller good luck 
payoff when in fact it has been unlucky. However, B(F + S)/S > D is 
equivalent to s < B/(D – B), s is a variable controlled by the firm and 
the firm’s profits are an increasing function of s (if D < H).19) Since, s 
< B/(D – B) also undermines its credibility by creating moral hazard, 
the firm has every incentive to increase s to the level s ≥ B/(D – B), 
at which point the firm will find it worthwhile to offer the optimal 
contract described above.
The credibility limit for the pure equity contract is s = s*. That for 
a pure debt contract is determined by the no-bankruptcy conditions 
– either s ≤ sl or s ≤ sb, which reduce, for this contract (in which 
DB=DG=D), to s ≤ B/(D – B) and s ≤ {δ(H – D) + (1 – δ)B}/{(1 – δ)(D – 
B) – δ(H – D)} respectively. All these limits are lower than ŝ, when 
D< 2B –when pure equity and debt contracts are dominated by 
the contract described in this section. However for D > 2B, pure 
debt contracts dominate as sb is then higher than ŝ . In all cases, 
however, there is a limit to the size of the firm, proportional to the 
personal wealth of the entrepreneur. All our qualitative results will 
therefore continue to hold.
(Gale and Hellwig 1985) model a costly state verification problem 
where firms have the potential of cheating their investors. Investors 
(often big entities like banks) can verify the state of nature, but 
verification is costly. The paper recommends a debt contract (which 
being state-invariant, leaves the firm with less scope for cheating 
by exploiting its private knowledge of the state) with the proviso 
that declarations of bankruptcy should be followed by costly state 
verification by the lender. Beyond one period, however, problems 
of renegotiation-proofness arise. This section shows that in spite of 
our focus on equity contracts, in principle a very similar analysis 
is applicable to a debt contract as well. In that event, firms could 
exploit their asymmetric information about the state of nature to 
declare bankruptcy and give the investors a cash flow consistent 
with bad luck. However, the same firms could, unless caught by 
the public signal, again be refinanced by investors who believe that 
19) D > H is incompatible with the existence of the firm since the entrepreneur would 
then prefer to become an outside investor.
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the firm genuinely experienced bad luck. If the public signal is 
sufficiently imprecise, investors know beforehand that the firms face 
too strong a moral hazard, and do not finance the industry.
EXTENSIONS
Our model suggests that the insiders’ temptation to cheat is an 
increasing function of the ratio of outsider to insider capital, but 
that auditing moderates this relationship, making a higher ratio 
consistent with honesty. This is reflected in international differences 
in shareholding patterns. In the US, for example, most firms are 
widely held: s is higher than in countries dominated by family-
owned firms or those where large blocks of capital are owned by 
other large companies, or banks – well represented on the board 
of directors and therefore “insiders.” Does this difference reflect 
differences in the auditing framework? Is firm ownership dispersed 
where better auditing safeguards small outside shareholders? We 
find much empirical support for this view. (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 1999) find that firms are widely held only in 
countries with strong shareholder protection (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
2002) comes to similar conclusions. (Simunic and Stein 1987) find 
that insider stake is lower in firms that hire big auditors, and (Francis 
and Wilson 1988) find that firms are more likely to switch to a 
bigger (better) auditor when ownership structure is more diffuse. In 
countries with weak shareholder rights, one often observes family 
owned firms. This fits in with family financing and underdeveloped 
share markets wherever shareholder protection (eg. a better auditing 
framework or better transparency) is inadequate. We have already 
mentioned (La Porta et al. 1997) which finds that firms tend to 
go public in the first place only if good measures of shareholder 
protection are in place. 
Of course, a widely held shareholding pattern also implies that 
when auditing is flawed, there is a great risk of investors being 
cheated. In our model shareholders are aware of the aggregate ratio 
of outsider to insider capital and can make their investment decision 
accordingly. However if this information could be kept secret – for 
example if insiders secretly divest (as in Enron), raising the ratio of 
outsider to insider financing – outside shareholders become more 
vulnerable.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Zero Savings Assumption
One possible justification for the no-savings assumption in our 
model is as follows. With risk-neutrality and a constant rate of time-
preference, the intertemporal utility function can then be written as
U = ∑δtct
where ct is consumption in the t-th period. The net utility increment 
from a one-period deferment of a unit of t-th period consumption is 
then
δt[– 1 +  δ(1 + rt)]
where rt is the rate of return to capital in the t-th period. With risk-
neutrality, savings no longer smoothe consumption. They now reflect 
only the difference, if any, between the rates of time-preference 
and of return on capital. When these are independent of the level 
of consumption, savings will have an all-or-nothing character. 
If capital can be consumed without limit and time preference is 
higher than the rate of return, all wealth will be dissipated in the 
first period. On the other hand, if the rate of return is higher, 
all income will be saved and consumption deferred indefinitely. 
Savings will be precisely zero if (1) capital is not consumable (a 
standard assumption, see (Bernanke and Gertler 1989)) and (2) time 
preference exceeds the rate of return.20) In our model, the highest 
rate of return is H: a sufficient condition for zero savings therefore is 
H < (1 – δ)/δ. Such a restriction is not inconsistent with any of our 
results.
One could of course question the origin of what wealth there is. 
Where did it come from if there are no savings?  Here, we must 
resort to ‘manna from heaven’ assumptions. All wealth could be 
land, as in some banana republic where the consumption good is 
too perishable to be stored. Alternatively, in an industrial economy, 
20) No one can dissave by trading capital for output, since, if one wishes to dissave, 
so will everyone  else – so that the potential dissaver cannot find anyone to trade 
with.
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wealth could be machinery, received by the country through foreign 
aid or as war reparations. Our essential purpose of course is a focus 
on the problem of cheating independently of the level or distribution 
of wealth; and all we need for this purpose is that the zero-savings 
assumption should be self-consistent, not that it should be realistic.
Appendix B: The Optimality of Multiple Collusions
An auditor who offers to collude with a single client can extract at 
most maximum the latter’s maximum gain from cheating
X = 
DSL
H
q P q Vh− + −
( ) ( )1 1
1
δ
δ
However, if exposed, he will lose the expected value of the fees paid 
by all of his clients – q(1)NδV/(1 – δ). Denote this by q(1)Y where Y 
is the discounted value of audit fees from all N clients. If, on the 
other hand, he offered to collude with all his clients, and this offer is 
accepted by all, his potential income from bribes would be multiplied 
by N, while the risk of exposure would increase from q(1) to q(N). 
(We have proved in the text that an offer acceptable to one client is 
acceptable to all). His income expectation from multiple collusion is 
NX – q(N)Y
His income from single collusion is
X – q(1)Y.
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for him to prefer multiple 
collusion is 
Nq(1) ≥ q(N).
This condition is sufficient because if it holds, multiple collusion 
yields more profits for the auditor than N times the profits from 
single collusion (and N cannot be less than one). An interpretation 
of the sufficient condition is that the risk of exposure should not 
increase more than additively as the number of firms increases. 
While this seems highly plausible, multiple collusion can be optimal 
even under weaker conditions.
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Appendix C: The Single Collusion Case
In the previous appendix we have derived conditions for an 
auditor to prefer multiple collusion to single collusion. However, 
even if the auditor preferred to collude with a single client, he would 
still end up relaxing the credibility ceiling, provided he has more 
than one client. We demonstrate this below.
In the case of collusion with a single client, the auditor’s 
probability of detection is q(1), the same that a firm faces; however 
if detected he loses the future fees from all his N clients, though he 
is bribed by just one. This has to do with reputation effects: once 
the auditor is exposed as a cheat firms find it worthless to hire 
him as investors no longer trust him. In this case the no-collusion 
constraint becomes:
Nq V DSL
H
q P q Vh
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
1 1
1
δ
δ
δ
δ−
> − +
−  
(19)
The left hand side shows the auditor’s total discounted losses 
from all his N clients in the event of exposure by the public signal: 
the right hand side is the maximum bribe offered to him by the firm 
with which he is colluding. The bribe remains the same as in the 
multiple collusion case. (19) in combination with the upper limit on 
audit fees gives us the following range for audit fees:
P DSL
H
V
DSL
H
q P
N qh
h
− >
−
>
−
−
δ
δ1
1
1 1
( )
( ) ( )
 (20)
Following the same logic as in the multiple collusion case, firms 
realize that they can drive down the audit fee to its lower limit, 
which is this time a different one, 
V* = 1 1
1 1
− −
−
δ
δ
DSL H q P
N q
h/ ( )
( ) ( )
, 
and that this fee is decreasing in N: therefore  each hires an  auditor 
with as many clients as possible driving N up to its technological 
maximum of L. Meanwhile for the range in (20) to be non-empty we 
require
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Nq P N q DSL
Hh
( ) [ ( ) ( )]1 1 1 1> + −  (21)
We can easily check that as long as N = L > 1, this range permits 
honesty in a parameter range where it would not have been possible 
in the absence of an auditor. We may also check that the new 
credibility ceiling on s becomes
s Nq H H D
DL N q Nq H H D
m1 1
1 1 1 1 1
= −
− + − − −
( ) ( )
( )[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
δ
δ δ
 
(22)
We can show that the condition that this be greater than s*, the 
credibility ceiling without an auditor, boils down to:
s sm1 > *
iff
( ( ))( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 0− − − >q N q DLδ
which always holds for a less then perfectly accurate public signal, 
provided N = L > 1.
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